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Abstract 
The way attackers execute attacks is incredible, they execute attacking commands form intermediate compromised host to remain 
anonymous instead from their own computers. These intermediate hosts are called as stepping stone host and attacks that 
attackers perform using stepping stones are called as stepping stone attacks. One solution to the problem of stepping stone attack 
is to detect stepping stone host so that we can break attacking path created and used by the attacker. In this paper, we propose a 
stepping stone detection approach which analyses the traffic flowing through the host to find out whether this is a stepping stone 
host or normal host. Our approach classifies traffic into two categories Stepping Stone Traffic and Normal Traffic using Neural 
Network. If the traffic flowing through the host belongs to the class of stepping Stone Traffic this indicates that host whose traffic 
is being tested is a stepping stone host otherwise it is a normal host. Our approach allows attacker to insert chaff packets and 
fixed delay, reshuffling of packet, padding, and encryption of attacking traffic. 
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1. Introduction 
There is tremendous change in the way computers can be used since the concept of Internet and Networks has 
arrived. The way Internet has revolutionized the use of computers in business, education and various other fields is 
quite appreciable. Enhancement and development of new technology has increased application of Internet and its 
efficiency [23].But true fact is that nothing can be perfect in all dimensions; the same concept is also applied on the 
Internet Technology. Although Internet has wide range of application in different fields and also provides large 
number of benefits to humans, but it also has got some weaknesses as well which are known as web application 
vulnerabilities [25-28]. Cybercriminals also known as attacker exploits these vulnerabilities to execute cyber-attacks 
 016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
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against computers and application connected to Internet [21-22, 29-32]. As we have mentioned above that the 
enhancement, development of new tool and technologies has increased applications of Internet. These tool and 
technologies add number of vulnerabilities to Internet Technology. The type of attack is defined by the type of 
vulnerability being exploited by the attacker; there are different kind of vulnerabilities such as software 
vulnerabilities, hardware vulnerabilities and many more.  
As the number of vulnerabilities are increasing the number of attacks is also increasing, attackers are developing and 
executing new attacks by exploiting these vulnerabilities [22]. There is a wide range of attacks that attackers can 
execute such as malware attacks, phishing attacks DoS attacks and the list is endless [24]. Attacker always remain 
one step ahead of the security professional and search for holes in the security system, and then exploit them to 
execute attack. Attackers always look for safe path that they can follow to remain anonymous while executing 
attacks. In order to remain anonymous they use anonymity techniques such proxy, which was develop with an aim 
to surf Internet without revealing identity to other users. But nowadays attackers use proxy while executing attacks 
[20]. Another technique that attacker use to remain anonymous is to use stepping stones in the path while execute 
attacks. The attacks that attacker perform using stepping stone are called stepping stone attacks. Stepping stone are 
intermediate host that attacker compromised to use them while executing attacking command [1, 2]. In stepping 
stone attack, attackers use scanning techniques to find out computers having low quality security management and 
then compromise it to take full control over it. After that attacker use previously compromised computer system to 
compromise other and also take control of newly compromised system and so on, in this way attacker form a chain 
of connection through intermediate compromised host.  Such a chain of connection is known as stepping stone 
connection chain and intermediate host that exist on connection chain is known as stepping stone host, any pair of 
connection in the chain is known as stepping stone connection pair. Finally the attacker executes attacking command 
from the last stepping stone host in the chain [1, 2, 3, 4]. Stepping stone attacks are more dangerous as compare to 
other attacks because they are quite flexible and can be used to perform any kind of attacks such malware attack, 
phishing attack, DoS and DDoS attacks and many more, which make them a major threat for computer and data 
security [9]. 
One possible solution to the problem of stepping stone attack is to detect stepping stone that has been created and 
used by the attacker, once we have found stepping stones we can filter and block the malicious traffic flowing 
through it. Many stepping stone detection techniques have been proposed by the researchers to prevent and detect 
stepping stone attacks. Most of them are vulnerable to some evasion technique. This motivated us to propose new 
stepping stone detection technique non-vulnerable evasion techniques. Proposed technique is based on two 
previously existing approaches, the Neural Network Approach given by Wu and Huang [6] and Packet Context 
Approach given by Jianhua yang and David woolbright [15]. In [6] Wu and Huang have mentioned that neural 
networks have the ability to analyse and classify network activity, by using this idea we differentiate between the 
normal traffic and stepping stone attacking traffic. In our proposed approach we also use the concept of packet 
context given by yang and woolbright in [15]. The packet context approach given in [15] correlate incoming and 
outgoing connection using the concept of packet context, on a host to identify whether it is a stepping stone host or 
normal host. Problem with this approach is that it cannot work well if host for which we are testing have only few 
incoming and outgoing connection. Thus in order to overcome the limitations of packet context approach we 
combine Neural Network Approach with Packet Context Approach. Advantages of packet context approach is that it 
is not vulnerable to chaff and delay perturbation and also have high detection rate thus our proposed scheme by 
default inherit its qualities and also work well even if a host have only few incoming and outgoing connections. Rest 
of the paper is organized as follows, in section 2 we discuss related work. In section 3 we define our proposed 
approach for stepping stone detection and in section 4 we discuss results implementation details. In section 5 we 
conclude this paper.  
2. Related Work 
    Many detection techniques have already been proposed in recent decade for stepping stone detection. First 
detection approach was developed by Staniford-Chen and Heberlein [1] this approach was based on the packet’s 
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content and was vulnerable to encrypted stepping stone attacks. Zhang and Paxon [2] proposed an ON/OFF 
correlation approach which correlates incoming and outgoing connections using their OFF periods, a successful 
correlation between an incoming connection and outgoing connection indicates detection of stepping stone. This 
scheme was capable of handling encrypted stepping stone attacks but have high false positive rate and also 
vulnerable to delay perturbation. Yoda and Etoh [3] proposed a deviation based technique; a number of problems 
were found in this technique such as finding deviation is not easy, and many other problems. Wang, Reeves and Wu 
[4] consider inter-arrival of packet to develop a new solution for stepping stone detection, but this scheme was 
vulnerable to delays perturbation. Ting He and L. Tong [7] proposed a scheme for stepping stone detection to deal 
with encrypted attacking traffic, they find the amount of chaff and delay that attacker can insert into the stream. 
They also have proposed scheme for stepping stone detection in the presence of chaff and delay. Ting He and L. 
Tong [8] also proposed packet scheduling approach for stepping stone detection in presence of chaff. In this scheme 
they have defined that random scheduling of traffic can reduce the efficiency of attack. Wu and Huang [9] proposed 
a packet fluctuation approach which uses the packet difference between incoming and outgoing connection for 
stepping stone detection. M. N. Omer et al. [10] have proposed a hybrid approach for stepping stone detection, this 
hybrid approach is a combination of network based stepping stone detection (NSSD) and host based stepping stone 
detection (HSSD) and is highly efficient but it is a complex approach in terms of implementation. 
 
Han-Wei Hsiao and Wei-Cheng Fan [11] have proposed a data mining approach for stepping stone detection. This 
scheme use Apriori algorithm to identify the transmission characteristics of stepping stone traffic on a host. Yang 
and Huang [12] have proposed a “Step-Function” approach to detect stepping stone intrusion. This approach use 
RTT of TCP/IP send packet to compute the length of stepping stone connection chain, but computing RTT of send 
packets in not easy task. Wei Ding et al. [13] have proposed stepping stone detection approach which differentiates 
between normal user and attacker depending upon length of connection chain that a client is using to connect to 
server. Ruei-Min Lin et al. [14] propose different approach which detect whether a host connecting to server is an 
actual client or proxy (stepping stone host). X. Wang et al. [16] proposed efficient sequential watermark approach 
for stepping stone detection. Watermark scheme inject a watermark in the incoming flow at a host and check if it 
appears on the outgoing flow, if yes this indicates that host is stepping stone host else a normal host. M. N. Omar 
[19] utilized stepping stone perspective to detect network threats including phishing, spam attacks etc. Most of these 
approaches are vulnerable to some evasion technique. Packet context approach given by Yang and Woolbright [15] 
is one of the most efficient approaches and is not vulnerable to chaff and timing perturbation (delay insertion), but it 
does not work if a host have less number of incoming and outgoing connection. This is the research gap which we 
have considered for development of new approach.   
 
3. Proposed Approach 
3.1 Neural Networks for Stepping Stone Detection  
Neural Networks are powerful tools for the analysis and classification of data. Neural network has been widely 
utilized in many fields of research to solve many critical and complex problems. Wu and Huang [6] have mentioned 
that neural networks have the capability to analyze and classify network activities and they have utilized neural 
network for stepping stone intrusion detection. In their scheme neural network is used to find out the length of 
stepping stone connection chain created and used by attacker. Neural network have not yet been applied for stepping 
stone detection, we are the first to use neural network for stepping stone detection. In our approach we use neural 
network to analyse traffic flow through host (host for which detection is being carried out) for stepping stone 
detection.  
3.2 Packet Context Definition and Its Advantages  
The packet context of a packet  is a sequence of timestamp differences between  and packets around . Suppose 
that PS = {P1, P2,P3… } is a TCP/IP packet stream, where  (1≤ j ≤n) represents the time stamp of packet in 
stream. Now the packet context of packet  within in a window of size 2w is given as follows, here w is belonging 
to the set of positive integers.  
Packet Context ( ) = {| - |, | - | … 
                                                                              … | - |, | - |, | - | … | - |}   (1) 
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The packet context of a packet  serves as an identity of the packet, where timestamp difference between  and 
some packet before and after are used as feature to identify uniquely. The packet contexts are of two type’s one 
is synchronous and second is asynchronous. Type of packet context depends upon the number of packet before and 
after . If in packet context the number of packets before and after  is equal then packet context is called as 
synchronous packet context, on the other hand if the number of packets before and after is not equal then such a 
packet context is called asynchronous packet context.  
3.3 Classification of Network Traffic 
In our proposed approach we analyse and classify network traffic based on the packet context of each packet 
captured. In order to differentiate between normal and stepping stone host we have defined two class of traffic, 
Normal Traffic and Stepping Stone Traffic. Packet context of packets in stepping stone traffic have different pattern 
as compare to the packet context of packets in normal traffic. If the traffic flowing through the host is identified as 
Stepping Stone Traffic, this indicates that the host is a stepping stone host otherwise it is a normal host.  
3.3.1 Stepping Stone Traffic 
In most of the attacks attacker aim is to steal some data or to execute attacking command against a computer 
machine. In such case the data flow in the form TCP/IP traffic from victim machine to attacker; packets flowing in 
traffic have timestamp approximately in consecutive sequence with very few number of outlier packet which have 
non-consecutive timestamp from previous and next packet. Due to the consecutiveness in the timestamp of TCP/IP 
packets, the packet context have values first in decreasing order then in increasing order, having approximately 
equal difference between any two consecutive values of packet context except few which represent packet drop or 
delay in  the delivery of packets. While in case of normal traffic the timestamp of packets is random due to which 
the packet context of packet have different pattern as compare to the packet context of packets in stepping stone 
traffic.  
Example 
Suppose w={P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7} is a window of size 2w=6 for packet P4 havingw (w = 3) packets on each side. 
Suppose {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} are the corresponding timestamp of packets from P1 to P7, now the symmetric packet 
context of P4 will have the form of  
Packet context (P4) = {3, 2, 1, 1, 2, 3}                                              (2) 
As it can be observed form the example given above that difference between any two consecutive values is less than 
or equal to 1. The same concept is applied on the actual stepping stone traffic. Thus from this example it is clear that 
packet context of packets in stepping stone traffic have specific pattern and we have utilized such pattern  as feature 
to differentiate between stepping stone traffic and normal traffic.  
3.4 Detecting Stepping Stone  
Each TCP/IP connection is made up of two packet stream send packet stream and echo packet stream, as shown in 
figure 1. Basically send packets are TCP/IP packet with Ack or both Push and Ack flag set and travel in the direction 
from attacker to victim. Echo packets are also TCP/IP packets and have Ack or both Ack and Push flag set, but they 
travel in the direction from victim to attacker.  Each echo packet is a response of one or more send packet means 
that each echo packet is directly triggered bya sendpacket or a group of send packets. Attacker generally modify 
send packet stream to escape detection system, therefore instead of considering send packet stream for stepping 
stone detection we have considered echo packet stream. As echo packet are the response of send packets and it is 
most likely that attacker will not modify echo packet stream, because any modification in echo packet stream will 
make network traffic more complex which may affect the performance of attacks. Therefore we have considered 
echo packet stream to detect stepping stones instead of send packet stream. 
 
Fig. 1: Stepping stone Detection Model 
 
Consider an echo packet stream E = {e1, e2, e3… en} which is incoming into host h. Now let’s take window of size 
2w = 6 and drive a mathematical expression for stepping stone detection.  
Suppose WE= {e1, e2, e3, e4, e5, e6, e7} represent a window of E with size 2W=6. Packet context of e4 is given by  
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  Packet Context (e4) = {e4-e1, e4-e2, e4-e3, e5-e4, e6-e4, e7-e4}                               (3)  
This can also be written as, Packet Context (e4) = {d1, d2, d3, d4, d5, d6}. A packet belongs to stepping stone traffic if 
its packet context satisfies following condition.  
For all i and j, where 1≤i ≤ 2w, 1≤  j ≤ 2w-1 and j = i+1  
 - ≤ th          (4) 
Here th represent a threshold which we drive from the observation of stepping stone traffic.  
In order to detect whether the traffic flowing through the host is Stepping Stone Traffic or normal traffic, a packet 
capturing tool TCPdump is used to capture the TCP/IP traffic from incoming connection on a host for which 
detection is being carried out. Once traffic has been captured, only echo packets are collected by eliminating rest of 
the packets through filtering. Dataset is prepared by calculating the packet context of all echo packets. Neural 
network are first trained using both Stepping Stone Traffic and normal traffic so that they can be used to analyse real 
time traffic. After neural network has been trained dataset is applied as input to the input layer of neural network. 
Neural network analyse the data set and classify traffic dataset based on the condition we have define in equation 4, 
now if the neural network classify traffic as stepping stone traffic then the host for which testing is being carried out 
is stepping stone host otherwise it is normal host.  
 
Fig. 2: Neural Network approach for Stepping Stone Detection 
 
3.5 Algorithm 
Algorithm Detect Stepping Stone Host (DSSH) given below is algorithmic form of our proposed approach. DSSH is 
applied on each incoming connection of the host to detect whether this host is a normal host or stepping stone 
host.DSSH use neural networks to classify collected traffic data, to detect which class traffic is belong to Stepping 
Stone Traffic orNormal Traffic. As DSSH use neural network to classify network traffic, they must be trained before 
they can be used for classification. We trained neural network using Stepping Stone Traffic and Normal Traffic. 
DSSH accept two parameters H and N, where H is the name of host and N is the number of incoming connections.  
 
Algorithm: Detect Stepping Stones Host(H, N) 
 For each incoming connection  of host H, where 1 ≤ n ≤ N 
i. Capture packets from and keep them in initial dataset ID 
ii. For each packet Pi, where 1 ≤ i ≤  m and  m is the number of packet captured 
a. If Pi is echo packet add it into new dataset D, otherwise ignore it. 
iii. For each echo packet , where 1 ≤ i ≤  l, l is the number of echo packets in dataset D 
a. Compute Packet Context of  and store packet context into final dataset FD 
iv. For each packet context , where 1 ≤ i ≤ k, where k is the number of packet context in FD 
a. Apply  as input to neural network 
b. Neural network will identify class of packet context using equation 4 given above 
c. If each packet context , 1 ≤ i ≤ k belong to the class of stepping stone traffic 
i. Return Stepping Stone Host Detected 
d. Else  
i. Return Normal Host 
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DSSH return stepping stone host if the traffic of one of its incoming connection belongs to the category of stepping 
stone traffic, definition and pattern of stepping stone traffic has been defined above. Figure 3, given below shows 
the flow chart representation of DSSH algorithm.  
 
Fig. 3: Flow Chart of DSSH 
 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Implementation setup 
In order to test the performance of our approach we have create a chain of connection oflength 4. There are five 
computer machines in the chain namely A1, A2, A3, A4, A5.All computer machinesare located in our university 
campus and are connected to a common LAN connection. In order to create chain of connection we use A1 to 
remotely login into A2 using opensshprotocol and then use A2 to remotely login into A3 and then use A3 to remotely 
login into A4. In this chain host A1 is the source of attack, while A5 is victim. Once the connection chain is establish 
stepping stone host A4 is used to execute attacking command. In order to simulate actual attack scenario, we perform 
data theft operation by executing data copy command at A4 to copy data from A5 to A2. A traffic monitoring tool 
tcpdump is issued to collect network traffic at host A3. Over fifty thousand TCP/IP packets were collected in a 
period of around 4 minutes.  
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Figure 4: Stepping stone connection chain of length four 
 
4.2 Preparing dataset from collected traffic data 
After collecting network traffic our next step is to prepare dataset using collected traffic trace which consists of 
around fifty thousand TCP/IP packets. Once the traffic trace is collected at host A3 using tcpdump then echo packet 
are filtered out and stored into new data file, a total of 8084 echo packet were filtered out from complete traffic 
trace. After that packet context of echo packet were computed and stored into final dataset FD. Final dataset FD 
servers as input to artificial neural network for stepping stone detection. FD consists of stepping stone attacking 
traffic, which we used to differentiate between stepping stone attacking traffic and normal traffic.  
In order to differentiate between stepping stone attacking traffic and normal traffic, we also collect normal traffic. A 
total of 903 TCP/IP packets were collect and packet context of each packet were computed. We compute packet 
context of all packets in normal traffic and add these packet context into final dataset FDN (Final Dataset of normal 
traffic). Now final dataset FDN is ready for training and testing on artificial neural network. 
4.2.1 Dataset 
We have created our own private dataset for stepping stone detection by combining FD and FDN. Our dataset 
consists of packet context of normal and attacking packets. Differentiation factor between normal and attacking 
packets is “maximum difference” of packet context which we have computed using equation 4. Maximum difference 
of a packet context is maximum difference between any two consecutive values of that packet context. According to 
maximum differenceof packet context, we mark it as stepping stone packet or normal packet. In experiment of our 
approach we have found that maximum difference value is larger in packet context of normal traffic packets as 
compare to attacking packets. If the maximum difference of packet context goes above threshold thwe mark it as 
normal packet, while for all packets instepping stone traffic, maximum difference is always less than th except for 
few packet context which represent delay in delivery and loss of packet. Figure given below shows how our dataset 
looks like, this figure represent only a small part of our dataset.  
 
Table 1:   Dataset 
S.NO. d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 maxdiff 
1 0.352338   0.22412 0.06164  0.175048   0.178303   0.180385   0.1717930 
2 0.399168   0.236688   0.175048   0.003254   0.005337   0.009846   0.1750480 
3 0.239943   0.178303  0.003254   0.002082   0.006591   0.015086   0.1750480 
4 0.180385   0.005338 0.002083 0.0045090 0.0130039 0.0146449 0.0032549 
5 2.541847  1. 218504 1.890626  1.218504  1.377388  1.675758  1.323343 
6 3.184270 3.109130  1.218504  0.158884  0.457254 0.458016 1.8906260 
7 3.268014  1.377388  0.158884  0.298370 0.299133 0.299955 1.8906260 
8 1.675758  0.457254 0.298370 0.000764 0.001586 0.004447 1.2185040 
9 0.458017 0.299133 0.000763 0.000823  0.003684 4.861252  4.857568 
 
As it can be seen in table 1 that top 4 rows has maximum difference (maxdiff) less than th (th=0.5). These top four 
rows represent packet context of packet belongs to attacking traffic means stepping stone traffic. Rows from 5 to 9 
represents packet context of packets belong to normal traffic and have maxdiff greater than th. 
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4.3 Results  
In order to detect stepping stones we test whether the traffic flowing through a host is stepping stone traffic or 
normal traffic; if traffic flowing through a host is stepping stone traffic this indicates that host is a stepping stone 
host otherwise it is normal host. Therefore in our proposed approach we need to make clear differentiation between 
normal and stepping stone traffic. The characteristic of traffic that we have used to differentiate between stepping 
stone traffic and normal traffic is maximum difference(maxdiff) of packet in the traffic. Figure 5(a) and 5(b) shows 
the maximum difference (maxdiff) value of packet context of each packet in attacking and normal traffic 
respectively. It can be clearly seen that maximum difference values in normal have larger values then normal traffic. 
4.3.1 Threshold Derivation  
In order to make clear differentiation between normal and attacking traffic we have derived a threshold value th 
(th=.01225). We use th to identify whether the traffic is stepping stone traffic or normal traffic. In order to derive 
threshold value thwe have tested the performance of our proposed approach at different values. Initially we have 
tested at th= .5, in this case packet context of 111 packet out of  8064 packet have maximum difference value greater 
th which is only 1.37 % of all malicious packet. This indicates that packet context of 98.63 % packets in attacking 
traffic have maximum difference less then th (th=.5)while this is not the case with normal traffic. In case of normal 
traffic packet context of around 234 packets out of 904 packets have maximum difference value greater then thwhich 
is 25.88 % of all normal packets. This means that in case of normal traffic packet context of only 75% of packets 
have maximum difference value less thwhile this was 98.63% in case of attacking traffic (stepping stone traffic). 
Therefore we can differentiate between stepping stone traffic and normal traffic by finding out the number of packet 
having maximum difference less then th. In this situation another threshold cth(Class detection threshold, cth= 
90%)can be used, such that if the percentage of packets in traffic having maximum difference value less then th is 
greater then cth, this will indicates that traffic is stepping stone traffic otherwise normal traffic. But the problem at 
th=.5 is that it will results into high false positive and false negative rate.   
Figure 5(a) plot a graph of dataset FD (final dataset for stepping stone traffic). you can see that in case of stepping 
stone traffic more than 95% packets have maximum difference value less then th (th=.5), out of 8064 packets only 
111 packets have their maximum difference value greater then th. 
 
Fig. 5(a): Graph of maximum difference value for stepping stone traffic 
 
Figure 5(b) shows graph of maximum difference value for normal traffic, it can be seen that around 25% of total 
packets have maxdiff greater then th. In case of normal traffic around 250 packets out of 904 have maxdiffgreater 
then th. 
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Fig. 5(b): Graph of maximum difference values for normal traffic 
 
In order to reduce false positive and false negative rate, and to enhance the performance of our algorithm we have 
optimize the value of th. A larger value of th will result into high false positive rate while very small value will 
increase false negative rate. If the value of thwill be large then more number of packet will have maximum 
difference less then thdue to which normal traffic will be considered as stepping stone traffic. If the value of thwill 
be small then more number of packets will have maximum difference value greater then thdue which stepping stone 
traffic may be considered as normal traffic. There for we need a precise value of threshold that which we get low 
false positive as well as low false negative rate.  
After testing the performance of our proposed approach at several values of threshold th we finally reached at 
conclusion that threshold value th=.01225 is best among all values. At threshold value th = .01225, we can clearly 
differentiate between normal and attacking traffic.  
i. At threshold th=.01225 we have found that out 809 normal packet, packet context of 620 packet have maximum 
difference value greater then th. This means that packet context of 77% of normal packets have maximum 
difference value greater then th=.01225 which was only around 25% with th=.5. This conclude that packet 
context of only 33% of normal packets have maximum difference (maxdiff) value less then th=.01225. 
According to this explanation using th=.01225, we can conclude that any traffic having more than 33% of  
packets whose packet context have maximum difference (maxdiff) value less than th should be considered as 
stepping stone traffic. Therefore value of classification threshold value of cth can be anything greater than 33%.  
ii. To find some meaningful value of cth we also have perform classification operation on attacking traffic with 
th=.01225. In this operation we have found that packet context of only 1536 packets out 8064 packets have 
maximum difference (maxdiff) value greater then th=.01225, which around 20% of all malicious packets. This 
indicated that in case of attacking traffic packet context of 80% of packets has maximum difference maxdiff 
value less then th=.01225 which was 33% in case of normal traffic.   
Thus by combining these two statements we can define a new value for cth=75%, which means that if packet 
context of 75%  or more packets in any traffic has maximum difference value less then th then this traffic should be 
considered as stepping stone traffic otherwise as normal traffic.  
In our experiment we have found that there is huge difference in the number of packets having maxdiffless than th, 
in normal and stepping stone traffic. This difference can be used as characteristic to identify the class of traffic. In 
order to classify traffic into normal or stepping stone traffic, we can see how much percentage of packets have 
maximum difference value less than th. Here we can use another threshold cth (classification threshold, cth = 75%), 
if packer context of 75% or more packet in a traffic trace have maximum difference value less then ththen we 
consider such traffic as stepping stone trafficelse traffic is normal. A host is stepping stone host if stepping stone 
traffic is flowing through it; otherwise it is a normal host. 
As shown in figure 6, confusion matrix is prepared using neural network pattern recognitionapplication in 
MATLAB to find out performance of our proposed approach in terms of detection rate and false positive rate.  From 
this matrix, we found that detection and false positive rate of our proposed approach is 91% and 0.2%, respectively. 
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Therefore, our scheme has high detection rate with low false positive and low false negative rate which show the 
effectiveness of our approach. 
 
Fig. 6: Confusion Matrix of Proposed Approach for Performance Evaluation  
 
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
Stepping stone attacks are one of those attacks which help attackers to remain anonymous while executing cyber 
attacks. Also stepping stone attacks can be used to perform different kinds of cyber attacks, there for stepping stone 
are most threatening as far as the security of network and computers is concern. Different stepping stone detection 
techniques which are based on different characteristic of network traffic have been proposed by the researchers, but 
attacker were able to find loop whole in those schemes. In this paper we propose a stepping stone detection approach 
which is based on the packet context approaches and also use neural networks to analyse traffic flowing through the 
hosts. Our proposed approach overcomes the limitation of earlier packet context approach using neural network. 
Packet context approach cannot work if a host have few incoming and outgoing connections but our approach 
depends on upon the traffic flowing through the connection not on the number of connection. As we are considering 
echo packets our approach has capability to handle chaff (insertion of dummy packets)and timing perturbation 
(insertion of delays) because nobody can delay echo packet as will it will make network traffic more complicated 
and reduce the efficiency of attacks. As far as chaff packet is concern there will no effects on echo packet, therefore 
our approach is not vulnerable to chaff packet. Padding, reshuffling, and encryption of attacking traffic will not 
affect performance of our algorithm. As we have used echo packet stream to stepping stone which attacker cannot 
modify, because any modification in echo packet stream make network traffic more complex which will ultimately 
reduce the efficiency of attack. Thus whatever modification attacker can do only in send packet stream therefore our 
scheme is not vulnerable to these evasion technique mentioned above.  
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